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ABSTRACT 
Live, broadcast defamation is a murky area of law garnering surprisingly scant 
scholarly attention.  But because libel law typically creates republication liability 
for broadcasters who air defamatory statements uttered by third parties—even 
when news organizations have no idea what the third parties are about to say—
broadcasters covering live, breaking news events face significant risks of liability 
for remarks by people at the scene.  This Article analyzes the case law of live and 
spontaneous broadcast defamation, explores the statutory backdrop in such cases 
and, ultimately, proposes a solution in the form of a “breaking news doctrine” that 
relieves broadcasters of republication liability if five prerequisites are satisfied.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a broadcast journalist for a local television station doing a live 
segment in the immediate aftermath of an apparent bombing of a downtown office 
building.  Having rushed to the scene with your cameraperson, you ask a 
question—“Who do you think committed this horrible act?”—of a bystander (Mr. 
X), who you anticipate will name a local man (Mr. Y) as the bomber.  That’s 
because you’ve overheard Mr. X—whom you have never met before but have no 
reason not to trust—telling others in the crowd that he knows Mr. Y did it. 
Sure enough, Mr. X names Mr. Y—a person of no particular notoriety or 
power—live on the air.  It later turns out that Mr. Y had nothing to do with the 
bombing.  Mr. Y sues you, your station, and Mr. X for defamation.1  Are you liable 
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 1. Defamation generally refers “to false communications about another person that damage that 
person’s reputation or bring her into disrepute.  Both slander and libel are forms of defamation.  The 
general purpose of libel law is to allow people who have been defamed to restore their reputations.”  
ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION 144 (4th ed. 
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for defamation, as well as your source?  What about your employer? 
Now, suppose you had not anticipated that Mr. X (the bystander) would name 
Mr. Y.  You had no idea, in fact, what Mr. X would say.  Would or should that lack 
of scienter, as it were, on your part make a difference in determining whether you 
and your station are liable for defamation?2  After all, as Professor Leslie Kendrick 
writes, “[t]he constitutional standards for defamation famously turn on the state of 
mind of the speaker.”3 
Ultimately, then, should courts and lawmakers create what the authors of this 
Article call a “breaking news doctrine” to protect broadcast journalists from 
liability in such time-sensitive scenarios?  Is there even a need for such a doctrine, 
given the current status of the law regarding what might be called live or 
spontaneous defamation cases? 
Surprisingly, the law of most states is quite murky in such scenarios.  One 
defamation treatise, authored by federal appellate court judge Robert D. Sack, for 
instance, describes these “rarely encountered cases” as an “interesting laboratory in 
which to examine republication problems.”4 
That’s because defamation law generally holds liable everyone who republishes 
a defamatory statement.  As the Restatement (Second) of Torts puts it, “[o]ne who 
repeats or otherwise republishes defamatory material is subject to liability as if he 
had originally published it.”5  This ancient principle was articulated by one 
nineteenth-century court with the pithy phrase, “Talebearers are as bad as tale-
makers.”6  So, if a statement goes out live over a broadcaster’s signal, regardless of 
who said it, the broadcaster is considered a republisher—and thereby culpable—in 
most jurisdictions. 
There are, of course, various ameliorating doctrines that may soften the blow of 
this “harsh” republication rule.7  These doctrines include a fair report privilege for 
reporting official statements by government officials and a neutral reportage 
privilege that exists in a few jurisdictions.8  Nonetheless, in many scenarios 
broadcasters face significant risks when third parties make defamatory statements 
in live broadcasts, particularly when the broadcaster has some advance knowledge 
of what is about to be said. 
 
2014). 
 2. Scienter generally refers to “knowledge and belief.”  A. G. Harmon, Defamation in Good 
Faith: An Argument for Restating the Defense of Qualified Privilege, 16 BARRY L. REV. 27, 49 (2011). 
 3. Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 
1636 (2013). 
 4. 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 
7–10 § 7:3.5(a)(2) (4th ed. 2010). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
 6. Harris v. Minvielle, 48 La. Ann. 908, 915 (1896). 
 7. See Jonathan Donnellan & Justin Peacock, Truth and Consequences: First Amendment 
Protection for Accurate Reporting on Government Investigations, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 237, 245 
(2006) (calling the lesson of the republication doctrine “a harsh one for journalists.  In practice, it places 
an almost impossible demand on republishers, who often lack first-hand access to the information 
reported upon, particularly when the subject is government investigations and allegations,” and adding 
that “[t]he harshness of the doctrine is one of design”) (emphasis added). 
 8. These doctrines are addressed in greater detail in Part I of this Article. 
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Despite the gravity of “live” defamation for broadcasters, there is almost no 
contemporary legal scholarship on the problem.9  This Article fills that void by 
deeply examining the jurisprudence of live defamation.  Specifically, Part I 
explores a variety of legal doctrines that prevent the application of republication 
liability.  Part II then analyzes case law involving live, on-air defamation.  
Although the cases illuminate the problem to some degree, relatively few 
jurisdictions have directly ruled on these issues and, when they have, the holdings 
are sometimes so narrow and fact-specific as to be less than helpful in predicting 
future outcomes. 
Next, Part III explores various state laws known as “due care” statutes that may 
affect the question.  Finally, this Article concludes in Part IV by offering 
suggestions for clarifying and improving the legal standards in this difficult area of 
the law.  Specifically, it suggests the potential adoption of a breaking news doctrine 
and it spells out the elements of such a doctrine. 
 
I.  PRIVILEGES AGAINST REPUBLICATION LIABILITY:  WHY NONE 
FIT THE LIVE-DEFAMATION SCENARIO 
Several extant doctrines, at least in some situations, may help to resolve 
defamation cases stemming from live broadcasts.  Professor David Ardia, for 
instance, observes that doctrines such as the fair report privilege, the wire service 
defense, and the neutral reportage privilege have developed over the years that 
“protect[] the republication of certain unverified statements.”10  This part addresses 
some of these principles and explains why they may or may not apply to live-
defamation cases like the hypothetical scenario at the start of this Article. 
A.  FAIR REPORT PRIVILEGE 
First Amendment scholar Rodney Smolla observes that “[t]he common law has 
long recognized the unique privilege to publish fair and accurate reports of certain 
defined judicial, legislative, and executive proceedings.”11  He adds that this 
privilege “is technically an exception to the normal common-law position that one 
who republishes a libel ‘adopts it as his own’ and becomes liable as if he were the 
originator of the defamation.”12 
This privilege, however, would not apply to the hypothetical in the Introduction.  
That’s because the broadcast journalist is not reporting a judicial, legislative, or 
 
 9. One of the few articles to broadly, but not directly, address the issue is now more than sixty 
years old.  See Robert A. Leflar, Radio and TV Defamation: “Fault” or Strict Liability?, 15 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 252 (1954). 
 10. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
373, 395 (2010). 
 11. 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN MEDIA CONTENT § 6:83, 6-608 (2d 
ed. 2011). 
 12. Id. at § 6:83, 6-609. 
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executive proceeding.  Rather, he is reporting on breaking news. 
Yet, the public policy behind this privilege certainly supports extending it to 
such scenarios and to the creation of a breaking news doctrine.  As Smolla, current 
Dean of Widener University Delaware Law School, encapsulates it, “[t]he rationale 
for the privilege is of considerable vintage but remains as relevant as ever:  The 
reporter is a surrogate for the public, permitting it to observe through the reporter’s 
eyes how the business of government is being conducted.”13 
By extension of this logic, the broadcast journalist described in the Introduction 
is a surrogate for the public who cannot be at the scene of an alleged bomb attack.  
The journalist permits the public to see and hear what others who are there are 
saying and doing at an event of obvious public concern.  The same journalist, in 
turn, fairly and accurately reported the comment by Mr. X that ultimately turned 
out to be false and defamatory. 
In brief, then, the fair report privilege would need to be extended beyond the 
narrow confines of selected governmental proceedings and stretched to apply to 
locations where breaking news of specific kinds—such as the possible terrorist 
attack in the bombing hypothetical—occur.  The difficulty in this extension, of 
course, is twofold:  (1) delineating the specific types of breaking news events to 
which the privilege would apply; and (2) determining when news no longer is 
“breaking,” as it were, such that the privilege would be extinguished by the passage 
of time. 
B.  WIRE SERVICE DEFENSE 
The wire service defense “was originally developed for newspapers who served 
as conduits for national wire service reports,”14 and it “recognizes the importance 
of publication before news becomes stale.”15  Today, it also reflects “the realities in 
which smaller market media outlets operate” and “the fast-paced world in which 
our modern media operate.”16  It does so by allowing local news operations to rely 
on content supplied by reputable news organizations, such as the Associated Press, 
without having to independently verify the content in the absence of something 
indicating it is false.17 
Historically, the wire service defense dates back more than eighty years to the 
Supreme Court of Florida’s ruling in Layne v. Tribune, Co., which held that: 
[t]he mere reiteration in a daily newspaper, of an actually false, but apparently 
authentic news dispatch, received by a newspaper publisher from a generally 
recognized reliable source of daily news, such as some reputable news service agency 
 
 13. Id. at § 6:83, 6-610. 
 14. Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prods. Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5489, 
at *19 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 27, 2002). 
 15. Ripps v. Gannett Co., Inc., CV 91-B-1954-S, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8552, at *18, n.4 (N.D. 
Ala. Mar. 3, 1993). 
 16. Burke v. Gregg, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 15, at *20–21 (R.I. Feb. 4, 2011), aff’d in part, 
vacated in part, 55 A.3d 212 (R.I. 2012). 
 17. O’Brien v. Williamson Daily News, 735 F. Supp. 218, 225 (E.D. Ky. 1990). 
BUNKER & CALVERT, “DEFAMATION LIVE”, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2016)  
2016] “DEFAMATION LIVE” 501 
engaged in collecting and reporting the news, cannot through publication alone be 
deemed per se to amount to an actionable libel by indorsement [sic], in the absence of 
some showing from the nature of the article published, or otherwise, that the publisher 
must have acted in a negligent, reckless carelss [sic] manner in reproducing it to 
another’s injury.18 
The defense generally applies “when a local media organization republishes a 
release from a reputable news agency without substantial change and without 
actually knowing that the release is false.”19  As a Michigan appellate court 
summed it up, the “defense is available where a local news organization 
reproduces, without substantial change or knowledge of falsity, an apparently 
accurate wire release by a reputable news-gathering agency.”20 
In the context of broadcasting, the wire service defense is “applied to shield 
network affiliates from liability when they act as mere conduits for national 
network news broadcasts.”21  Because the heart of the defense is the principle that 
“that there can be no ‘conduit liability’ in the absence of fault,” it applies in the 
broadcast context only “where the affiliates merely acted as conduits for the 
broadcast and played no role in its reporting, production or editing.”22  In brief, a 
local affiliate must have “absolute non-involvement with the underlying 
broadcast.”23 
The public policy behind the wire service doctrine—that journalists should not 
be held strictly liable (liable without fault) when they act as mere conduits of 
information, especially in a fast-paced media world24—supports creating a breaking 
news doctrine for situations like that described in the Introduction.  This seems 
especially true when journalists have no advance reason to doubt the credibility of 
the people they interview live. 
Policy aside, however, the wire service defense itself clearly would not apply to 
such situations for several reasons.  First, the doctrine only applies when the source 
of the information is a reputable news agency, such as the Associated Press or a 
broadcast television network, not a man-on-the-street bystander like Mr. X in the 
opening hypothetical.  Second, the broadcast journalist in the hypothetical is 
involved in the underlying broadcast; he chooses who to interview and the 
questions to ask.  Thus, the requirement of “absolute non-involvement with the 
underlying broadcast” is not satisfied.25 
 
 18. 108 Fla. 177 (1933). 
 19. Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prods. Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 745, at 
*11 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1999). 
 20. Howe v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 219 Mich. App. 150, 154 (1996). 
 21. Kapetanovic v. Stephen J. Cannell Prods., Inc., No. 97 C 2224, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 745, at 
*12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 1999). 
 22. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 931 F. Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Ariz. 
1996) (emphasis added). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.; see also Burke v. Gregg, 2011 R.I. Super. LEXIS 15, at *21 (R.I. Feb. 4, 2011). 
 25. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants, 931 F. Supp. at 1492. 
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C.  NEUTRAL REPORTAGE PRIVILEGE 
A few courts have extended a so-called neutral reportage privilege to protect 
journalists when they convey certain false statements about public figures.26  The 
privilege “developed in the 1970s to shield unbiased reports of newsworthy 
defamatory statements,”27 with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
laying the foundation in Edwards v. National Audubon Society.28 
Citing the “public interest in being fully informed about controversies that often 
rage around sensitive issues,” the Second Circuit in Edwards articulated the 
privilege as follows:  “when a responsible, prominent organization like the National 
Audubon Society makes serious charges against a public figure, the First 
Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested reporting of those charges, 
regardless of the reporter’s private views regarding their validity.”29  In brief, the 
privilege holds that “a republisher who accurately and disinterestedly reports 
certain defamatory statements made against public figures is shielded from liability, 
regardless of the republisher’s subjective awareness of the truth or falsity of the 
accusation.”30 
Even among those few courts today that do recognize the neutral reportage 
privilege, it would not apply to the scenario in the Introduction.  That is because it 
is “only applied to cases involving public figures.”31  Recall that Mr. Y—the 
defamed individual in the hypothetical—is “a person of no particular notoriety or 
power.”  Furthermore, the privilege would not apply because the source of the 
defamatory statement must be “a responsible person or organization.”32  In this 
instance, the source (Mr. X) was a bystander previously unknown to the journalist.  
Thus, while the public policy behind the neutral reportage privilege of allowing the 
press to supply newsworthy information to the public without fear of liability may 
support the application of the privilege to the scenario at the start of this Article, its 
actual elements would thwart its usefulness. 
D.  SECTION 230 IMMUNITY 
Finally, it must be briefly noted that while Section 230 of the Federal Communi-
cations Decency Act provides immunity from defamation liability for those who 
relay content supplied by third parties, the privilege is limited in application to an 
 
 26. See Ashley Messenger, The Problem With New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: An Argument for 
Moving From a “Falsity Model” of Libel Law to a “Speech Act Model,” 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 
172, 185 (2012) (noting that “[a]lthough some courts have extended protection for neutral reportage, 
most have not”). 
 27. Dan Laidman, When the Slander is the Story: The Neutral Reportage Privilege in Theory and 
Practice, 17 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 74, 76 (2010). 
 28. 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 29. Id. at 120. 
 30. Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
 31. TRAGER ET AL., supra note 1, at 214. 
 32. KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 166 
(9th ed. 2014). 
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“interactive computer service.”33  It thus would not apply to the broadcast journalist 
described in the Introduction. 
In summary, this discussion has illustrated how several doctrines and privileges 
that shield defendants from liability for defamation do not apply to the newsworthy, 
live-defamation scenario described in the Introduction.  This is despite the fact that 
the underlying policy concerns behind some of the doctrines and privileges 
described above, especially when viewed collectively, provide some support for 
establishing a carefully articulated breaking news doctrine. 
 
II.  THE CASE LAW OF LIVE AND SPONTANEOUS DEFAMATION:  
RADIO CALL-IN SHOWS LEAD THE WAY 
Most of the relatively small samples of reported live-defamation decisions have, 
in free press friendly fashion, cleared broadcasters of liability.  Consider, for 
example, Adams v. Frontier Broadcasting Co., decided by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court in 1976.34  Bob Adams, a businessman and active Wyoming politician, sued 
Frontier, owner of KFBC radio, after a live caller to KFBC’s talk show, “Cheyenne 
Today,” defamed him.  The caller, after saying that she had a prepared statement to 
read, stated that Adams “had been discharged as Insurance Commissioner for 
dishonesty.”35 
After finding that Adams was a public figure and thus requiring him to demon-
strate actual malice, as in New York Times v. Sullivan, the state Supreme Court 
upheld a lower court’s summary judgment determination that the failure of the 
station to employ an electronic delay system did not rise to the level of actual 
malice.36  While it was undisputed that the radio station lacked actual knowledge of 
the content of the caller’s remarks—and thus could not know them to be untrue 
prior to the broadcast—Adams unsuccessfully argued that the failure to use a delay 
system amounted to “reckless disregard” under Sullivan and thus constituted actual 
malice.37 
The court noted that to establish reckless disregard, “it was and is Adams’ 
burden to point to factual material in the record which could constitute proof that 
Frontier in fact entertained serious doubts with respect to the truth of this 
publication.”38  Adams could, of course, not meet that standard because the station 
had no foreknowledge whatsoever of the content of the caller’s remarks.  The court 
further reasoned that because, under Sullivan and its progeny, failure to investigate 
 
 33. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2015). 
 34. 555 P.2d 556 (Wyo. 1976). 
 35. Id. at 557. 
 36. In Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment “prohibits a public official 
from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves 
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 37. Adams, 555 P.2d at 563. 
 38. Id. at 564. 
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is not equivalent to actual malice, neither was “simply depriving oneself of the 
opportunity to evaluate the information and form a conclusion with respect to 
falsity or doubt as to truth.”39 
In dicta, the Adams court added that broadcasting was an area heavily regulated 
by the federal government, which had outlined clear policy goals to avoid 
censorship.40  The requirement of delay technology to avoid defamation liability 
might tempt the broadcaster to “screen out the comments of those with whom the 
broadcaster, for whatever reasons, did not agree . . . .”41 
A Washington appellate court reached a similar conclusion in 2011 in Brecht v. 
Fisher Communications, Inc.42  Paul Brecht, a prominent endorser of a local 
political candidate, sued the Fisher Communications radio station for defamation 
after two anonymous callers during a morning talk show accused him of having 
been convicted of domestic violence.43  The court found that because Brecht was a 
limited-purpose public figure, and the talk show hosts had failed to evaluate the 
anonymous callers’ statements ahead of time “or to form some conclusion as to the 
truth or falsity of those statements,” Brecht was precluded “from making the factual 
showing necessary to demonstrate actual malice.”44 
In one case where an electronic delay system was available but unused, the Utah 
Supreme Court nonetheless found that failure to activate the “panic button” did not 
create liability for the station.  In Demman v. Star Broadcasting Co., an anonymous 
caller on a radio show verbally attacked a local political candidate at 2:30 p.m. on 
Election Day.45  Although the station was equipped with a delay, the host failed to 
press “the panic button to cut off the air,” as the court described it.46  The Utah 
Supreme Court nonetheless, in an oddly jovial opinion, held that this failure did not 
rise to the level of malice and thus affirmed a judgment in favor of the radio station. 
At least one reported case from a Louisiana appellate court reached the opposite 
conclusion.  In Snowden v. Pearl River Broadcasting Corp., callers to a live call-in 
radio show accused the plaintiffs, including a local doctor, of selling illegal drugs.47  
The station, which did not own delay equipment, defended on the grounds that the 
statements were protected by the First Amendment since there was no actual malice 
and because the statements concerned “private individuals who become involved in 
an event or subject of public or general interest.”48  The latter standard derived 
 
 39. Id. at 565; see also Weber v. Woods, 334 N.E.2d 857 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (finding that the 
conduct of broadcaster passively carrying defamatory remarks of talk show guest did not rise to level of 
actual malice); Pacella v. Milford Radio Corp., 462 N.E.2d 355 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (same). 
 40.  Adams, 555 P.2d at 565 (“In addition, this case arises within an administered area which 
appropriately has been preempted by the federal government, and within which the federal government 
has legislated, regulated, and litigated extensively.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. 2011 WL 1120506, 160 Wash. App. 1040 (2011). 
 43. Id. at *1. 
 44. Id. at *6. 
 45. 497 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1972). 
 46. Id. at 1379. 
 47. 251 So. 2d 405 (La. Ct. App. 1971). 
 48. Id. at 409. 
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from the now discredited U.S. Supreme Court plurality opinion in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia, Inc., a decision that extended Sullivan’s actual malice doctrine to 
private-figure plaintiffs for the few brief years it was considered good law.49 
Applying the actual malice standard, the Louisiana court in Snowden found that 
the station’s conduct rose to the level of reckless disregard for the truth.50  The 
court reasoned that it “would have no difficulty in finding a station liable, if it 
received defamatory material from an anonymous source, and broadcast the report 
without attempting verification.  The direct broadcast of such anonymous 
defamatory material, without the use of any monitoring or delay device, is no less 
reprehensible in our judgment.”51  The court also found that the program’s host did 
little to discourage defamatory statements or unfounded rumors from being aired.52  
As a result, the broadcast of anonymous, defamatory remarks “was easily 
foreseeable and likely to occur, as it in fact did.  In our judgment, the First 
Amendment does not protect a publisher against such utter recklessness.”53 
Snowden seems poorly reasoned, at least when compared to Adams and the other 
cases discussed above.  Although one might agree with the Snowden court that it 
might be “reckless,” as that term is used colloquially, to turn live callers loose on 
the air with no delay, that sort of recklessness is not the appropriate standard 
according to Sullivan and its progeny.  “Reckless disregard” is a legal term of art 
that requires proof that the defendant was highly aware of the probable falsity of 
the statement or, put slightly differently, had serious doubts about the veracity of 
the statement.54 
The Adams line of cases readily seems to carry the better interpretation here—
namely, that until a broadcaster actually knows the contents of the assertion, there 
can be no such serious doubt.  In the case of a live broadcast, the statement already 
has been transmitted before the broadcaster can even begin to assess the statement’s 
veracity, so establishing reckless disregard simply is not possible.  Even with a 
delay of some seconds, there would almost certainly not be sufficient time to make 
the complicated judgment necessary to decide if a particular statement was 
 
 49. 403 U.S. 29 (1971), abrogated by Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see 
David A. Elder, Truth, Accuracy and Neutral Reportage: Beheading the Media Jabberwock’s Attempts 
to Circumvent New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 828 (2007) (“What now 
seems quite clear is that the Court will not revive and enhance Rosenbloom v. Metromedia’s now 
discredited qualified First Amendment privilege for matters of public concern . . . .”). 
 50. Snowden, 251 So. 2d at 410. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (“The procedure employed amounted to an open invitation to make any statement a 
listener desired, regardless of how untrue or defamatory it might be, about any person or establishment, 
provided only that the declarer identify himself.  The announcer’s qualifying remarks did not even 
remotely indicate that unfounded remarks were out of order, or that statements and accusations should 
be based on personal knowledge, or that mere rumor, speculation, suspicion and hearsay would not be 
permitted.  The clear import of the announcer’s remarks was that an identified caller was free to make 
such accusations as he chose.”). 
 53. Id. at 411. 
 54. See Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665–67 (1989) (addressing 
the meaning of actual malice and reckless disregard); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 
(1964); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730–31 (1968). 
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defamatory and to then analyze one’s subjective sense of the truthfulness of the 
statement. 
Actual malice pivots on the defendant’s mental state of mind at the time of 
publication, not a course of conduct per se.55  Essentially, it poses an epistemologi-
cal question—what did the plaintiff know about the truth of the statements in 
question?  If the defendant knew nothing at the time of publication, and the 
presence or absence of delay technology seems almost irrelevant given the 
extremely limited time to process the statements, then actual malice in either its 
“known falsity” or “reckless disregard” guises seems utterly impossible.  
Unfortunately, however, the Adams line of cases holds almost no relevance in a 
situation in which either:  (1) actual malice is not required (because the plaintiff is a 
private figure, as in the case of Mr. Y in the hypothetical at the start of this Article); 
(2) the broadcaster has some advance knowledge of the nature of the third-party 
statement; or (3) both.  Thus, the current case law provides slight and slender 
guidance for the breaking news situation addressed in the Introduction.  A number 
of states, however, have statutes that might come into play in such a scenario.  
Those statutes are addressed in the next part of this Article. 
 
III.  “DUE CARE” STATUTES:  STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR LIVE 
BROADCASTERS 
Numerous states have adopted specific statutes designed to protect broadcasters 
from statements made by third parties during live broadcasts.56  As described 
below, these statutes typically require a demonstration either by the plaintiff that 
the broadcaster was negligent or by the broadcaster itself that it was not negligent.  
In either situation, however, negligence replaces the harsh ramifications of strict 
liability or liability without fault. 
Consider, for example, Virginia’s statute, which provides that owners and 
operators of broadcast stations, as well as their agents, shall not be liable for a 
defamatory statement “published or uttered” by third parties unless the plaintiff 
proves that the broadcaster “failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or 
utterance of such statement, in such broadcast.”57  This language is apparently part 
of a “model act” suggested to state legislatures by the National Association of 
 
 55. See Messenger, supra note 26, at 220 (observing that “the actual malice standard typically 
requires an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the publisher”). 
 56. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-183 (2014); CAL. CIV. CODE § 48.5(1) (2015); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 13-21-106 (2015); FLA. STAT. § 770.04 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-10(A) (2014); IND. 
CODE ANN. § 34-1-5-2 (2014); IOWA CODE § 659.5 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-209(j) (2014); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.062 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Tit. 14, §153 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 
25-840.02(1) (2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 515:6 (2014); OHIO REV. CODE § 2739.03(B) (2014); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 31.200(1) (2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-6 (2014); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE ANN. § 73.003 (2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 45-2-7 (2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-49 (2014); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.36.130 (2014); W. VA. CODE § 57-2-4 (2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-29-
101 (2014). 
 57. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-49 (2015). 
BUNKER & CALVERT, “DEFAMATION LIVE”, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497 (2016)  
2016] “DEFAMATION LIVE” 507 
Radio and Television Broadcasters (now the National Association of Broadcast-
ers).58  Similarly, South Dakota law provides that “the complaining party” must 
prove that the broadcaster “failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication or 
utterance of such statement in such broadcast.”59 
Other states have similar statutes, but place the burden on the broadcaster to 
establish an absence of negligence.  Ohio, for instance, removes liability for third-
party statements from broadcasters “if the owner, licensee, or operator proves that 
the owner, licensee, or operator exercised reasonable care to prevent the publication 
or utterance of the statement in such broadcast time.”60 
Texas’s statute allows libel defendants to put into evidence “all facts and 
circumstances under which the libelous publication was made” in order to help 
“determine the extent and source of actual damages and to mitigate exemplary 
damages.”61  This seems to allow broadcasters in breaking news scenarios like that 
described at the start of this paper to put into evidence the “facts and circumstanc-
es” that the story demanded immediate coverage and that the broadcasters did not 
know in advance what the bystander-source would say.62 
A number of these statutes also exempt broadcasters from liability completely 
when defamatory statements are made by candidates for political office, given that 
broadcasters are sometimes required by federal law, particularly the equal 
opportunities provision, to carry such statements.63  Ohio’s statute has this 
exemption “if the statement is not subject to censorship or control by reason of any 
federal statute or any ruling or order of the federal communications commission 
made pursuant thereto . . . .”64  A typical statute of this sort has no negligence 
component—the broadcaster is held entirely blameless due to the unavoidable fact 
that the candidate’s speech is forced upon it by government mandate and the 
broadcaster has no legal ability to censor the speech. 
The “due care” statutes that require negligence and would apply to a live 
broadcast situation have been somewhat overtaken by the constitutionalization of 
libel law that followed Sullivan.  The majority of these statutes were passed in the 
late 1940s or 1950s, a time when much of the common law of libel was under a 
strict liability standard.65  With such a brutal regime for defendants, a negligence 
requirement, regardless of the placement of the burden of proof, no doubt seemed 
quite auspicious to the broadcasters who lobbied for these statutes.  Since Sullivan 
and Gertz v. Welch, Inc.,66 however, most states now require negligence for all 
 
 58. See Am. Broad.-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson, 126 S.E.2d 873, 876 n.2 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1962). 
 59. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-11-6 (2015). 
 60. OHIO REV. CODE § 2739.03(B) (2015). 
 61. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 73.003 (2014). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2015). 
 64. OHIO REV. CODE § 2739.03(A) (2015). 
 65. See Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: Putting the Horse Behind the 
Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 3, 78 (1985) (writing that “[a]t common law, defamation was a strict liability 
tort and, even in actions for slander, the only issue of fact was publication”). 
 66. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
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private plaintiffs to recover damages against public defendants,67 meaning that the 
“due care” statutes in many cases simply codify what the law would be in any event 
in a private plaintiff action, regardless of the medium by which the defamation was 
disseminated. 
Although the “due care” statutes were an advance in their own era from a free 
speech perspective, the authors of this Article believe enhanced protection is 
needed in the breaking news scenario discussed in the Introduction.  The final part 
of the Article concludes with an analysis of the state of law in this scenario and 
proposes a breaking news doctrine that the authors believe is a preferable 
alternative to the current state of affairs. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Under current defamation doctrine, broadcasters already possess reasonable 
protection for live and spontaneous defamatory statements uttered by third parties 
that happen to be about public officials or public figures (rather than private 
individuals).  That’s largely because the actual malice standard, which focuses on 
the subjective state of mind of the defendant about the statements at the time they 
are uttered, is rarely breached in practice.68  Additionally, if courts follow what 
appears to be the majority rule from the Adams case discussed earlier, it would be 
quite difficult to hold a broadcaster liable for third-party live utterances that 
concerned public plaintiffs.69 
Of course, one complicating factor is that broadcasters, often with very little 
lead time, would need to somehow determine the public or private status of the 
potentially defamed party with legal accuracy in order to feel confident of this 
protection.  In breaking news scenarios like that described in the Introduction, 
fathoming public versus private status in rapid fashion would be exceedingly 
difficult, amounting to a vast burden on broadcast journalists that might well delay 
reporting information to the public.  Nonetheless, if indeed the potential plaintiff 
turns out to be a public official or public figure in the judgment of a later court—
something that is not always a straightforward determination—the Sullivan regime 
seems to provide relatively reliable protection. 
In private plaintiff litigation, however, suddenly all bets are off.  The negligence 
standard that would almost certainly be applied in most jurisdictions creates broad 
latitude for juries to weigh a variety of factors and to produce an essentially 
impressionistic determination of whether the broadcaster exercised reasonable care 
or was negligent.  A few jurisdictions do, indeed, apply a higher fault standard than 
negligence, including New York, which has established a “gross irresponsibility” 
 
 67. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 3.10 (2d ed. 2014). 
 68. See C. Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of 
Mind: The Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 253 (1993) (observing that 
actual malice focuses “on the defendant’s state of mind regarding the truth or falsity of the defamation” 
and that “[t]he concern of the actual malice standard is with the defendant’s own subjective state of 
mind”) (emphasis omitted). 
 69. See supra notes 34–41 and accompanying text (addressing Adams). 
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standard.70 
Nevertheless, most states have adopted negligence as the relevant standard in 
private figure defamation cases.71  In the scenario discussed in the Introduction, 
where a broadcast reporter has foreknowledge that a source may utter potential 
defamation against a private plaintiff on live air, it seems not at all unlikely that a 
jury could find the broadcaster (and its employee) to be negligent. 
The authors of this Article believe such weak protection is inadequate to protect 
the press and, in turn, the public’s unenumerated First Amendment right to know.72  
Breaking news situations often are enormously important to the public, and 
reporters must be able to rapidly provide as much information as possible without 
undue fear of later legal consequences.  Whether the story concerns a terrorist 
attack, a school shooting, a violent demonstration, a natural disaster, a humanitarian 
crisis, or a host of other critical topics, such information must reach the public 
quickly and without unnecessary self-censorship.  This holds particularly true with 
the use of third-party sources, who may be the only people available on short notice 
with firsthand knowledge of, or perspective on, the event.  If journalism is to be the 
rough draft of history, then that first draft of breaking news must be sketched with 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” reportage.73 
The imposition of the negligence standard simply does not do enough to protect 
broadcasters from liability for live or spontaneous utterances.  Negligence is wildly 
unpredictable, given the array of factors that a jury may consider.  One commenta-
tor astutely notes that, “[t]he myriad devices that may be used to demonstrate 
negligence on the part of a defendant in a defamation case are as wide and diverse 
as the collective imagination and ingenuity of the plaintiffs’ bar.”74  The 
Restatement offers three factors that can be considered when determining 
negligence in defamation cases:  (1) a time element (how important is prompt 
publication?); (2) the level of importance of the interest in publishing the 
information; and (3) the extent of the injury if the statement proves false.75  
Nonetheless, as one libel scholar notes, “tort theories of negligence have long 
permitted an evaluation of ‘all the circumstances’ in assessing ‘reasonable care’. . . 
 
 70. Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 569, 571–72 (N.Y. 1975). 
 71. BRUCE SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 8.3.1 (2d ed. 2003 Supp.). 
 72. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (finding that “[t]he right of freedom 
of speech and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to 
receive, the right to read”) (emphasis added); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND 
THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 242 (1991) (writing that “[a]lthough often 
tied specifically into demands for freedom of information statutes and open meeting laws, the right to 
know gained a momentum of its own and was, by the end of the 1960s, treated by the media as a 
synonym for freedom of the press”); Eric B. Easton, Public Importance: Balancing Proprietary Interests 
and the Right to Know, 21 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 139, 141–42 (2003) (observing that “[f]ew of the 
corollary principles that grow out of the First Amendment have inspired more thoughtful scholarship 
and impassioned debate than the notion that an implicit right to know accompanies the explicit right to 
speak”). 
 73. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
 74. SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 3:95. 
 75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. h (1977). 
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.”76  Given the potential swirl of factors that may overwhelm lay jurors with little 
knowledge of news media practices and scant appreciation for the exigencies of 
breaking news, a negligence standard arguably creates too much uncertainty to 
allow the necessary freedom to report breaking news in a broadcast context. 
Instead, this Article suggests a possible breaking news doctrine that would 
provide enhanced and more determinate protection in the live and spontaneous 
defamation context.  It is somewhat akin to the sudden emergency doctrine in 
negligence tort law, under which “a defendant who is confronted by an emergency 
is not expected to exercise the same amount of care as is a defendant not facing 
exigent circumstances.”77  The sudden emergency doctrine springs from the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that, “[i]n determining whether 
conduct is negligent toward another, the fact that the actor is confronted with a 
sudden emergency which requires rapid decision is a factor in determining the 
reasonable character of his choice of action.”78 
Although the concept of a breaking news doctrine is, to the authors’ knowledge, 
an original one, it is hardly without support in existing law.79  As noted above, the 
Restatement considers the timeliness of news to be an important factor in a 
negligence determination.80  Similarly, as Dean Smolla notes, “courts frequently 
take into account the presence or absence of time pressure in assessing the 
existence of actual malice, evidencing a much greater tendency to excuse such error 
made in a ‘hot news situation.’”81  While considering breaking news as a factor in a 
fault determination is certainly worthwhile, the authors believe courts should go 
further in situations like that described in the Introduction.  Multifactor analyses in 
the law are notoriously slippery, while a more determinate privilege for breaking 
news could provide the protection necessary to safeguard this vital broadcast role. 
Adding to the confusion of the negligence standard, different jurisdictions 
cannot agree on the perspective from which to consider whether a defendant 
exercised reasonable care.82  Some jurisdictions focus on the professional standard 
 
 76. SANFORD, supra note 71, § 8.3. 
 77. David A. Logan, All Monica, All of the Time: The 24-Hour News Cycle and the Proof of 
Culpability in Libel Actions, 23 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 201, 218–19 (2000). 
 78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296(1) (1965). 
 79. A LexisNexis search conducted by the authors on September 9, 2015, of both federal and 
state case law, as well as law review articles, for the phrase “breaking news doctrine” revealed no 
responses.  Professor David Logan, however, has argued against a journalistic emergencies defense, 
asserting that, “a journalist’s self-serving assertion that a particular story is ‘hot news’ should not be 
treated as an abracadabra to which courts must defer.”  Logan, supra note 77, at 220.  Logan adds that 
“courts must be vigilant to rebuff unjustified efforts by the media to transform every reportorial context 
into ‘hot news.’”  Id. 
 80. Supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
 81. SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 3:75. 
 82. See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Proof of Fault in Media Defamation Litigation, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 247, 342 (1985) (observing that “[c]ourts that have considered the question have split on 
whether to apply a professional or an ordinary person standard”); Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: 
News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53 FORDHAM. L. REV. 449, 454–57 (1984) (observing 
that “[m]ost states require the private figure plaintiff to prove negligence, but this is only half of the fault 
equation.  The courts must also decide whether to apply an ordinary negligence standard or a journalism 
malpractice standard,” adding that “[m]ost courts that have recognized the distinction between the 
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of care, asking the jury to consider the difficult question of whether a journalistic 
defendant has committed professional malpractice given industry standards in the 
media business.83  “Customs and practices within the profession are relevant in 
applying the negligence standard,” in the Restatement formulation.84  Other 
jurisdictions ignore this dimension entirely and focus solely on the ordinary 
reasonable person standard, which itself creates serious problems for a lay jury.85  
As Dean Smolla wryly notes, “[a]nyone, these cases seem to intimate, can 
understand the job of a reporter or editor.”86  These discordant standards add more 
confusion and uncertainty to the negligence determination.  And, ultimately as 
Professor Kendrick emphasizes, “[a] negligence standard pays no regard to the 
actual state of mind of a speaker and thus takes insufficient account of speaker 
interests.”87  In the live and spontaneous defamation scenario, of course, the 
broadcaster is the speaker for purposes of the republication rule. 
For these reasons, the authors believe breaking news should constitute a defense 
to defamation, similar to the fair report privilege, for live broadcasting during 
important breaking news events.  As a tentative first step to identifying the scope of 
such a privilege, the following elements might be considered by courts, all of which 
must be present for the privilege to be successfully asserted:  (1) a bystander or 
private person who is previously unknown to a journalist; (2) at the scene of a 
breaking news event that is of public concern;88 (3) utters a spontaneous, false and 
defamatory remark to that same journalist; (4) about another private person; (5) live 
on the air. 
A key foundation of this doctrine is that the breaking nature of a news event 
 
ordinary negligence standard and the journalism malpractice approach have chosen to employ the 
ordinary negligence standard,” and pointing out that “[o]ther courts appear to employ a reasonable 
journalist standard, but do so in form only.  Although these courts use malpractice language, they fail to 
inform the jury how the standards of the reasonably prudent journalist are to be established . . .”). 
 83. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chumley, 317 S.E.2d 534, 537 (Ga. 1984) (defining 
negligence “by reference to the procedures a reasonable publisher in appellants’ position would have 
employed”); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976) (observing that “[o]rdinary 
care is that degree of care which ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the same kind of business 
usually exercise under similar circumstances, and the failure to exercise such ordinary care would be 
negligence”). 
 84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B cmt. g (1977). 
 85. Cf. Don R. Pember & Clay Calvert, Mass Media Law 197 (19th ed. 2015) (asserting that “[i]n 
simple terms, negligence implies the failure to exercise ordinary care.  In deciding whether to adopt the 
negligence or the stricter actual malice fault requirements, state courts are providing their own 
definitions of the standard”). 
 86. SMOLLA, supra note 67, § 3:93. 
 87. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1292 (2014). 
 88. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote that: 
Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can “be fairly considered as relating to any 
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community” . . . or when it “is a subject of 
legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public.” 
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (internal citations omitted).  The Snyder court pointed to 
three elements courts should consider in determining if speech relates to a matter of public concern—
content, form and context.  Id. 
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does not permit a journalist adequate time to ascertain the truth of an assertion 
before it is broadcast.  This holds true even if the journalist anticipates, to some 
degree, what might be said on camera, either through hearing the source make the 
statement to others or through some sort of pre-interview procedure.  Should 
adequate time be available to investigate the statements in advance of broadcast, 
however, then the privilege would be vitiated. 
The authors fully recognize the difficulties, from a legal perspective, in deter-
mining how much time is too much time for the privilege to lapse.  Yet courts 
already use and wrestle with the phrase “breaking news” in defamation cases.89  
Ultimately, in the heat of a live news event, a journalist should not be forced to 
either avoid the interview or halt an interview in progress or face the possibility of 
serious legal repercussions later. 
Furthermore, the fact that the source bystander is a private person previously 
unknown to the journalist should not strip away First Amendment interests.  
Indeed, as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he inherent worth of the 
speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the 
identity of its source.”90 
The proposed breaking news doctrine can profitably be compared to similar, if 
more capacious, protection for third-party comments offered to websites through 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.91  Section 230 provides 
immunity from republication liability to an “interactive computer service”—which 
courts have interpreted to include website operators—for third-party statements.  
Although Section 230’s reach extends beyond defamation, it is a powerful example 
of how protecting a medium against republication liability can enhance free speech 
values.  The proposal here is far more modest, of course, but it similarly advances 
First Amendment concerns by ensuring that information that may be of great 
importance to the public is not censored by broadcast entities to avoid reputational 
harms via republication. 
In summary, live defamation scenarios are fraught with peril for broadcasters, 
particularly when the targets of spontaneous defamatory remarks are private 
individuals.  A breaking news doctrine could offer meaningful clarity in those 
scenarios, while significantly furthering First Amendment values, including the 
public’s right to know about events of public concern.  At the very least, the 
authors hope this Article sparks scholarly and, perhaps, legislative debate about the 
pros and cons of adopting such a privilege. 
 
 89. See Levesque v. Doocy, 557 F. Supp. 2d 157, 169 (D. Maine. 2008) (noting that “[o]ne would 
hope that when a publisher is poised to report outrageous quotations from such a source, for a story that 
is not even breaking news, the publisher’s failure to confirm the accuracy of the quotations demonstrates 
‘an extreme departure from professional standards’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Harte-Hanks 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989))); Curran v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 
546 A.2d 639, 648 (1988) (opining that the issuance of a criminal “indictment was a breaking news 
story of regional importance and not the type of story to which several days could be devoted in writing.  
It is undisputed that [reporter] Frump was writing with a deadline, a factor which must be weighed in his 
favor”) (emphasis added). 
 90. First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). 
 91. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2015). 
